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Abstract
One of the most important topics in hazard and disaster related research is the
effective reduction of vulnerability. Despite the fact that our knowledge about
several physical and human dimensions of disasters has grown rapidly in recent
decades, there is ample evidence that casualties and damages due to natural disasters
have grown even faster. Apparently, there is no such formula like ‘more data = better
knowledge = less casualties and damages’.
Purpose of this paper is the identification of some potential reasons for this
obvious dilemma. After briefly addressing selected social science concepts of
hazards, disasters, and risks, it is argued that good research leads to – scientifically –
good models and predictions, but not necessarily to ‘good’ decision-making meant to
reduce vulnerability to hazards. Both physical and human factors need to be brought
together. Furthermore, research should focus on those most vulnerable to hazards and
disasters as real target beneficiaries.
The identification of practical ways to enable decision makers to make more
sense of information will belong to the fundamental challenges of future hazard
research.
Introduction
Without doubt, the field of disasters, risks, and hazard studies fascinates a fast
growing academic community. Each disaster seemingly testifies again that there is a
problem we have not yet fixed properly. Within this community, a rich variety of
approaches can be found: some scholars want to reconstruct, others to predict; some
want to observe and ‘understand’ (Verstehen’), others to intervene. At least with
reference to geohazards or ‘natural’ hazards and disasters in general, the fascination
of the object of research – in one way or another – does not derive solely from its
awfulness. Many are allured by the concept that the research object includes both
nature and society, man and environment. Society usually does not belong to the
‘classical’ research objects of engineers, geologists, hydrologists, geo-morphologists
or specialists in volcanoes and earthquakes. Vice versa, current social and cultural
perspectives are not designed to comprehend nature ‘as it really is’, but rather
semantic fields of the term ‘nature’.
The field of hazards and disasters is rich in ironies. Funding for prevention
and mitigation is much easier to receive after a disaster – although evident that the
returns would have been higher if efforts in prevention and mitigation had started
already before the last disaster. The history of recovery and reconstruction after a
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disaster is rich in examples where people did the same as they did before. However,
does the return to the status quo ante not mean that the same calamity will occur
again, one day or another? Some refer to this as the “disaster-damage-repair-cycle“
(Tobin and Montz 1997). Into the same direction points the notion of the so called
„hydro-illogical cycle“ (National Drought Mitigation Center 1998). Since more than
sixty years, we have written testimony that efforts meant to minimise losses due to
natural events might, in the end, increase the total sum of such losses instead. In
1937, when he was a young officer of the National Resources Planning Board,
Gilbert White made clear: Floods exceeding the design limits of dykes will cause
greater damage than would have occurred in the absence of such protective structures
(Platt 1986: 48-49). This contiguity does mean not less than: By intending to make
the flood plain a safer place we stimulate investments which, one day, will show up
in the loss figures. Without such structural means, fewer investments had had been
made in the flood plain in question.
Everybody involved in the hazard- and disaster scene knows such examples.
They show: If the aim of research on hazards, risk and disasters was the effective
reduction of the number of casualties and losses, we must admit that we failed – at
least, on the global level.
Many have argued that the problem’s complexity exceeds the capacity of a
single discipline and that interdisciplinary work is a necessity. Unfortunately, there
are massive hindrances to a true and honest interdisciplinary success. Still basic
terms like ‘disaster’ and ‘risk’, ‘natural event’ and ‘hazard’ are used as if referring to
age-old empirical realities that are self-evident (Hewitt 1998: 76). Eric Waddell
(1983: 38) referred to hazard research as an “ideological battlefield” already in 1983,
and since then the rifts between the manifold paradigms have appeared to be widened
– no matter of IDNDR or similar programs. To make things worse, behind these
terms and their manifold meanings lay, mostly implicitly, world-views, underlying
assumptions and over-simplifications.
The traditional formulation of the problem is quite close to commonplace
perspectives: Disasters are discrete phenomena, believed to be external to social
systems upon which they impinge. This approach holds that disasters and society are
related to each other in a cause-and-effect-manner (Blaikie et al. 1994). Perspectives
like that are challenged increasingly, mainly by social scientists.
‘Natural Disasters’?
April this year saw the 30th anniversary of a paper published in Nature by Phil
O’Keefe, Ken Westgate, and Ben Wisner (1976), celebrated in modesty by the Radix
website (http://www.radixonline.org). The title of the paper in question is “Taking
the Natural Out of 'Natural Disasters’”. Possibly this was the first peer-reviewed
paper decidedly refusing the idea of “Natural Disasters”. The authors argue that such
a distinction between natural and technological hazards was misleading. Even more,
this taxonomy is accused to perpetuate the ideology of a nature separate from society
and encouraging a belief in natural disasters as inevitability. As opposed to natural
events, hazards and disasters are, from such a perspective, by definition social:
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“The time is ripe for some form of precautionary planning which considers
vulnerability of the population as the real cause of disaster – a vulnerability
that is induced by socio-economic conditions that can be modified by man, and
is not just an act of God. Precautionary planning must commence with the
removal of concepts of naturalness from natural disasters.” (O'Keefe et al.
1976: 567)
By closer examination, earlier examples of the argument can be found. Exactly 400
years before O’Keefe, Westgate and Wisner published the paper mentioned, a man in
Cairo was deeply impressed by the great earthquake in Cairo early in the morning of
the April 2nd, 1576. Ibn Al-Jazzar was his name. Since he was not satisfied by the
standard explanations of that time, he elaborated the idea of building houses in a way
that they would not collapse when the ground shakes (Taher 1979, quoted from
Schulze 2004: 111). He suggested that earthquakes were god’s will, and man should
keep silence about their possible objects. To him it was unambiguous that earthquakes meant ordeals for humans. Nevertheless, he argued, that the fatal
consequences of earthquakes can be minimized by – first – the right moral conduct
and – second – by better building techniques (Schulze 2004: 104). We can read this
early scholar as an example for the idea that calamities do not just result from fate,
and a deity’s will but from human behaviour, values, and decisions.
In the year of 1932, a social scientist published a similar argument in the
United States:
“Not every windstorm, earth-tremor, or rush of water is a catastrophe. A
catastrophe is known by its works; that is, to say, by the occurrence of disaster.
So long as the ship rides out the storm, so long as the city resists the earthshocks, so long as the levees hold, there is no disaster. It is the collapse of the
cultural protections that constitutes the disaster proper.” (Carr 1932: 211;
quoted from Dombrowsky 1998: 24)
At least in geographical thought, from the outset of modern hazard research it was
conceived as axiomatic that features of the environment can only be regarded as a
hazard as long as it does (or could) affect man and his possessions. An earthquake in
the desert affecting not a single person might be an extreme and extraordinary event,
but neither a hazard nor a disaster (White 1974).
Interestingly, at least in Germany the affected parts of the public are very
sensitive to the question of causation of disasters. The 1997 deluge of the Odra River
was identified by politicians and by media as once-in-a-millennium-flood, as ‘natural
disaster’. Interviews with people affected by this flood showed that they hardly felt
as ‘victims of nature’. Nobody challenged the idea of naturalness of high water
levels. However, what, from their perspective, needed an explanation, was: Why did
the dyke did not protect them this time, if it did so for so many years? Many were
believed to be responsible for their calamities: Why did the authorities neglect the
dyke’s maintenance? Why this contradictory early warnings, why this overall
incompetence in initial emergency response management, why this inconsistent
evacuation appeals? Looking upstream, many felt as victims of forest dieback and
omitted reforestations, of ongoing sealing due to construction, of river regulation and
wrong management of retention basins and so on (Felgentreff 2000; 2003). No
matter if a decision-maker is identifiable or not: Important is that people ascribe their
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calamities to decisions (Pohl 1998) – usually to decisions made by third parties, but
not oneself.
While some researchers interested in hazards and disasters conceptualise all kinds of
disasters regardless of their assumed (man-made or so-called natural) trigger as
problems of purely corporate integration, others keep to the idea of critical relations
between man and environment. However, for social scientists the focus of interest
does not lie in the analysis of environmental problems as such, but in the question
how they are treated; in this case on how societies and their subgroups deal with
hazards and disasters.
“Since about fifteen years ago, however, a new perspective has emerged that
views hazards as basic elements of environments and as constructed features of
human systems rather than extreme and unpredictable events, as they were
traditionally perceived. When hazards and disasters are viewed as integral parts
of environmental and human systems, they become a formidable test of societal
adaptation and sustainability. In effect, if a society cannot withstand without
major damage and disruption a predictable feature of its environment, that
society has not developed in a sustainable way.” (Oliver-Smith 1996: 304)
Because of such arguments, many social scientists refrain from the usage of the term
‘natural disaster’ (Pelling 2001). From a social perspective it is structural and
systemic – but nonetheless man-made – causes that generate disasters (Blaikie et al.
1994: 11). In fact, one can hardly think of disasters that are not linked to human
presence, action and decision-making, in one way or another.
All this reasoning about the social causes of disasters is similarly applicable to the
hazard concept. To most natural scientists and engineers, hazard refers to a feature of
environment, to a natural event. The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(ISDR) defines a ‘Geological hazard’ as…
“Natural earth processes or phenomena that may cause the loss of life or injury,
property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental
degradation.
Geological hazard includes internal earth processes or tectonic origin, such as
earthquakes, geological fault activity, tsunamis, volcanic activity and emissions
as well as external processes such as mass movements: landslides, rockslides,
rock falls or avalanches, surfaces collapses, expansive soils and debris or mud
flows.
Geological hazards can be single, sequential or combined in their origin and
effects.” (ISDR n.d.)
Again, the counter-argument is that not the process itself is the hazard, but only in
relation to material assets, values or lives exposed to the process or phenomenon in
question. That means, the concept of hazard includes two dimensions, the
physical/environmental and the human/social. Neglecting the social context can
provide not more than incomplete knowledge (Sarewitz and Pielke n.d.: 3).
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On Vulnerability
In engineering terms, it is the combination of the vulnerability of the built
environment and the hazard that creates the risk specific to a hazard, e.g. the
earthquake risk (Somerville and Leith 2006). In this sense, vulnerability “…means
the degree of loss to a given element at risk or set of such elements resulting from the
occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude” (Granger 2000: 3).
Following such an understanding of the term vulnerability, it is often measured on a
scale from 0 to 1.
What appears almost as monolithic in the sphere of natural sciences and
engineering (Glade 2004) is a contested field in the realm of social sciences, where
dozens of different concepts of social vulnerability compete (e.g. the overview
provided by Weichselgartner 2002). At least for social geographers influential was
and still is the definition that Ben Wisner and his co-authors suggested:
“By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a person or group and their
situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and
recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or
process).” (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 11; italics in original)
It is clear that such a concept of vulnerability is difficult to handle empirically. For
instance, how a person or a group will recover after a calamity is hardly predictable
in detail and can be analysed only in retrospect. Although rare and restricted to
material dimensions, there are cases where households were much better off after a
destructive ‘natural disaster’ – can we call them as ‘vulnerable’? Examples can be
found in the German Odra River valley where formerly small and sub-standard
houses badly affected by the 1997 Odra River flood soon got retrofitted and
modernized with the assistance of insurers, donations made by the public and by
state compensation schemes. Observers like neighbours assume, many houses are
much more luxury since then (Felgentreff 2000).
Since the 1970s, many studies indicated the crucial significance of societal
conditions in disasters:
“Material losses were often disproportionately concentrated according to age,
gender, occupation, social position and, above all, lack of wealth and political
voice. Even the effectiveness of risk assessment, warnings and emergency
preparedness, depended most on whether or how they are (least) available to
those most in need of them.” (Hewitt 1998: 77)
Cases illustrating the relationship between socio-economic status and the distribution
of human casualties are numerous – see the consequences of Hurricane Katrina
(SSRC 2005). Although not applicable to each societal context, it remains a truism
that it is generally the poor who suffer more than the rich do. Vulnerability is not
identical with poverty, but often highly correlated (Wisner et al. 2004: 12).
Colin Green (2004) makes an interesting point in stressing that most versions of the
term vulnerability constitute a conjunction …
“… relating something or someone who is vulnerable to something else as a
source of potential harm because of some property of the subject or the object.
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Vulnerability implies something therefore about the relationship between the
subject and the object as well as the relevant characteristics of either or both
the object and the subject of the argument. The meaning of ‘vulnerability’ may
thus be context specific rather than being a universal concept. What we mean
by ‘vulnerability’ may consequently depend upon the nature of the decision
that must be made and what the decision involves.” (Green 2004: 323-324)
Following this understanding, at the start the desired state sought to achieve or
maintain needs definition. Consequently, what the hazard is follows from the
definition of desirability, but is not objectively present (Green 2004: 324).
There are good reasons to regard vulnerability as the basic problem. From a
social science perspective, it appears as being a social problem, which cannot be
fixed just by technical means. Even if one argues that the problem with hazards and
disasters was many people’s lack of problem-solving capacities due to a lack of
technical fixes, the question “Who is responsible for such a lacking” would remain.
“Instead of answering that question, it is much easier to turn causality toward the
overwhelming forces coming from outside.” (Dombrowsky 1998: 24)
Decisions and decision-makers
Provided that decisions are ‘good’, they can bring about effective reduction of
vulnerability (Sarewitz and Pielke n.d.: 13), whereby their capacity to reduce
vulnerability is difficult to measure.
Not just professional decision-makers like politicians make decisions relevant
to the creation and reduction of vulnerability. The decision of how to allocate money,
time and energy must be made each day by everybody and each household. Each
decision implies risks, not least because failure might be accredited to the person
held responsible for the decision. A homeowner in an earthquake-prone region
deciding to completely rebuild and upgrade his home according to earthquake safety
regulations acts exemplary in the light of disaster prevention. Socially and culturally,
he might fail to meet basic standards when this investment means he cannot afford to
pay his children’s tuition fee anymore.
In many places worldwide, the likelihood of car theft, crop failure,
unemployment or burglary is much higher as compared to losses related to storms,
flooding or landslides. Although being very different types of extreme events, their
consequences and outcomes are similarly unwanted (Sarewitz and Pielke n.d.: 4).
Since resources are always limited, decision-makers face the problem of how to
allocate these resources properly between the different hazards (Green 2004: 326).
This problem applies not just to households but also to other levels of decisionmaking. As Philip H. Berke observed:
“Natural hazard issues are usually given low priority on local government
agendas. Low priority, however, is not necessarily due to a lack of awareness.
Research findings from surveys of risk perception indicate that the general
citizenry and key decision-makers (planners, building officials, public works
engineers, and so forth) are aware of hazards, but put a low priority on taking
action, and have little concern for doing so.” (Berke 1998: 79)
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What – with reference to the reduction of vulnerability to one particular type of
unwanted event – appears as questionable and is sometimes labelled as bounded
rationality might in real world terms be the result of the necessity to minimize overcomplexity. Generally, knowledge about single risks has proven to be only a weak
predictor for their individual assessment (Wildavsky 1993: 194).
Often people do neither know nor believe what could happen to them. In
Germany, apparently only a small portion of floodplain dwellers is aware that a flood
exceeding the design of the structural protection will affect their house. Even more, if
there is a dyke between the house and the water, from a legal point of view in
Germany, this house is not at risk of flooding at all and no specific building
standards are mandatory. In other context, many groups and individuals do not have
any leeway for alternative decisions at all; they can hardly be blamed for ‘bad’
decisions.
Decision makers – including ‚ordinary people’ – should have access to all
sort of relevant knowledge and information. The questions are, what exactly means
relevant, how should information be formatted in order to become useful, and what
can be done to make sure they end up in ‘good’ decisions in the above-mentioned
sense? Answers to these questions will be difficult to obtain, but Sarewitz and Pielke
(n.d.) have made worthwhile suggestions for a framework for research and policy.
The basic requirement is that useable and appropriate knowledge can be generated.
In this respect, we might witness progress in future.
Grasping the ‘big picture’?
On another level, another problem arises. It is systemic and structural in nature and
cannot be abolished just by better practice: It is widely accepted that reduction of
vulnerability is achievable through several ways and the combination of different
measures – before and after the impact, avoidance of ‘hazardous’ terrain or by
manipulation and hopefully preventing of the triggering process. Who can rightfully
claim to have the definite answer to the question, which combination of measures in
which dose was the appropriate in a given context, for presence and future?
Having the ongoing academic disputes about environmental controversies in
mind, Daniel Sarewitz recently argued against the “… old-fashioned idea that
scientific facts build the appropriate foundation for knowing how to act in the
world.” (Sarewitz 2004: 385) The same argument has been raised with reference to
ecosystem management:
“More information provides an ever-larger pool out of which interested parties
can fish differing positions on the history of what has led to current
circumstances, on what is now happening, on what needs to be done, and on
what the consequences will be. And more information often stimulates the
creation of more options, resulting in the creation of still more information”
(Michael 1995: 473, quoted from Sarewitz 2004: 389).
Further options to reduce vulnerability will develop with further information and
insights that are more penetrating than today. The more measures available, the
greater the chance to fail by recommending some and neglecting other options. As
scientists, we can never rely on eternal validity of our knowledge. Each such
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recommendation implies the risk of turning out to be wrong, since each casualty, and
even damage, will count as counter-evidence difficult to justify. We can keep this
risk low by different strategies; e.g., conducting ‘good’ science according to our
profession’s standards and keeping our horizon restricted to the process in question,
blinding out practical issues of vulnerability reduction and potential research
beneficiaries.
On this road, we will not come that far in respect to vulnerability reduction.
We should aim to do something about all floods and not about some, all earthquakes
and not just the minor. The residual risk is not identical with the so-called accepted
risk, but both are perfect prerequisites for the disasters of tomorrow.
Future will always be uncertain in that sense that nobody ever can exclude
everything unwanted and negative occurring to him in future. However, this overall
uncertainty appears as only a minor portion of the problem. Global population
development is an instructive example provided by James Jackson: In twenty years,
the cities of developing countries will have about two billion more residents. It can
be taken for granted that a large proportion of these additional city dwellers will
reside in regions known to be notoriously earthquake-prone. One thing is certain,
good buildings save lives in earthquake-prone terrain. If only little can be done to
retrofit all already existing buildings in these cities, was it not a good idea to at least
make sure that construction of the houses to be built is adequate (Jackson 2006)?
What exactly will happen when the next massive earthquake rocks the Teheran
region with its 14 millions inhabitants (Anonymous 2005: 7) is unthinkable and far
beyond our imagination. Nevertheless, what appears as unthinkable in terms of its
awfulness is, according to tectonic expertise and likelihood, very likely to happen
one day, eventually.
Carefully considered, Green’s above-mentioned argument (what the hazard
is, is the consequence of the definition of desirability) demands for all-embracing
visions. They would not only include answers to questions like what desirable living
conditions mean for whom and touch on concepts of quality of life, but also on
ethical issues like justice and human rights. Apart from attempts like the Federal
Emergency Management Agency website “Ready Kids” (FEMA n.d.), hazard texts
remain remarkable silent in this respect. Instead, the stock of literature ties up to
implicit and commonsense value judgements (e.g. alive is better than dead, sane is
better than sick, functional better than smashed and broken). Surely, strong
arguments can be positioned against the formulation of such ample visions, e.g. that
it would overstrain the professional domain of perhaps all single academic
disciplines. On the other hand, the call for action is plain to see. Although it is clear
that the results will always remain unsatisfactory, second-best solutions are better
than completely neglecting of disasters ahead.
Such research would require changes in science policy. So far, ‘best’ science
is defined primarily by criteria inherent to the research system. In most cases, merits
derived from ‘good’ models and predictions will outdo those for research
successfully enabling decision-makers to make ‘good’ decisions. Public value of
science would benefit from research programs considering additional criteria and
incentives. As Sarewitz and Pielke (n.d.: 13) suggested, the understanding of the
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decision contexts in the realm of vulnerability reduction in face of extreme events
could provide a promising framework.
Conclusion
As demonstrated, from a social perspective, origins of disasters can be seen in
crushing of human relations and social vulnerability instead of natural and external
agents beyond society. Seemingly, terms like ‘disaster’, ‘hazard’, and ‘vulnerability’
are intrinsically contextual. They refer not just to physical and ‘objective’ events but
also to human perception of consequences. Studying solely the physical dimensions
and letting the respective social context aside can never produce more than
fragmentary knowledge.
This is not to say that it should become an assigned task for engineers to solve
problems, which, as pointed out, can be comprehended as being social problems. The
decision-making process tackling with options to reduce vulnerability should be
rigorously paid tribute to. Decisions are not yet understood to be central research
issues in the field of hazards, disasters, and vulnerability.
Although difficult to achieve and perform, interdisciplinary work could be a
cure against attempts to hide unaware or knowingly societal aspects in ‘black boxes’.
Supplementary to meeting disciplinary standards for ‘good’ scientific conduct,
studies dealing with vulnerability should take those into account who are most at
risk. They are not the ordering party for scientific expertise, but they should belong
to its first beneficiaries.
What people do or fail to do about features of their environment identified as
dangerous will be a reflection of how they choose among competing values. And the
more knowledge and options become available, the more decisions have to be made
– decisions which always include the possibility of failure.
Making such choices for other people is not what scientists are expected to
do. Instead, it is the job of democratic politics and of the people themselves. Science
can at most direct attention to problems and help to understand how to achieve goals
– for instance, the goal to reduce social vulnerability. To accomplish the goal of a
disaster-resistant society is a continual task that will never be finally accomplished,
and the avenues to reach it often collide with other goals.
In the end, we face multiple uncertainties. Not just that future is always
contingent and uncertain. To make things worse, as scientist we can never be certain
that our knowledge is ‘good’ in terms of vulnerability reduction. Nor will there be
ever something as certainty, whether or not decision-makers will derive ‘good’
decisions from this knowledge. The implications of these interactively entailing
uncertainties are hardly to overlook. Nevertheless, these implications might be very
close to the root of the problem – that globally we lose increasingly in the context of
so-called ‘natural disasters’, while more and more data, information, and knowledge
is accumulated.
Acknowledgement: Comments on an earlier version of this paper by Christian
Kuhlicke (UFZ Leipzig) are gratefully acknowledged.
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